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RUSI Lord Trenchard Memorial Speech: The Future of UK Air Power | RUSI 20 Oct 25
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a huge privilege to be here today at RUSI for the annual Trenchard Memorial Lecture and, looking across those in attendance, there appears to be an impressive spectrum that covers the entirety of the Defence Enterprise.
I’d like to thank Neil Watling for the kind invitation to speak at this stunning location and to his team for setting everything up so impeccably.
Chief of the Air Staff last gave this lecture in November 2024, and since then the Royal Air Force, and broader Defence, has seen significant change. We have a new Chief of Defence Staff – ACM Sir Rich Knighton who assumes his new role within a structure now titled the Military Strategic Headquarters, which under the auspices of Defence Reform, sets his mandate differently to his predecessor.
We also have a new Service Chief – ACM Harv Smyth – and I will provide a summary later in this lecture about what his initial priorities are, but as spoiler, under a strap line of making the Roya Air Force more A-I-R……. Agile, Integrated; and Ready….. will be the mantra that we in the RAF will be using during his tenure as CAS.
From the purview of Air Power, much has changed since Sir Rich Knighton last stood at this lectern. He spoke about ‘every generation thinking that it lives in the most tumultuous time in history, or that the world is rapidly changing, and that we are at an inflection point’ but then bounded the risk of such a statement being considered hyperbole, by reiterating that ‘our job in defence is to anticipate these risks, and adapt so that we are ready to protect our country, our interests, and our people.’
(Slide) - Kofman quote and picture of SDR
So, what does the SDR need us to adapt for:
For both sides, the drone dominated attritional war in Ukraine continues to show us what happens if we fail to master Control of the Air from the outset – it is something that is almost impossible to do retrospectively. Indeed, the longer the conflict reigns, this lesson becomes ever more compelling. Equally threatening, is the fact that the longer we observe Russia developing its Defence Industrial Base in a wartime environment, the quicker and more potent it will become when its war with Ukraine is over. (Pause) to avoid any doubt, Russia will be our pacing threat and must be our primary focus for many years to come.
More globally, we have seen turbulent tensions between India and Pakistan, in which Air Power was the mechanism they used to purvey intent and subsequent tool for military escalation.
But it was from an up-turned Middle East where the interactions between Israel and Iran so clearly demonstrated that Control of the Air, and the subsequent ability to undertake long-range strikes with near total freedom, allowed military events to deliver the elements that were required for political resolution.
So, in the near-term how are we addressing this context?
The new Chief of the Air Staff intent is very simple: to safely accelerate the RAF’s current warfighting capacity and readiness; collegiately deliver the SDR and Defence Reform; and make the RAF more Agile; Integrated; and Ready. He wants a searing spotlight on fine-tuning what we already have, to maximise our lethality today; but he’s equally focussed on accelerating modernisation, such that we can credibly deter, and it needs to be done at pace and within this decade – time is our most pressing threat and our transition through 5th into 6th Generation warfare needs to be about ongoing evolution, rather than waiting for revolutionary improvements that are measured in decades not days.
(Slide) - futuristic F35 with CCAs
Therefore, the future of UK Air Power that I describe is probably a lot closer than you think.
The picture I present behind me doesn’t depict a futuristic concept. It’s very much in the here and now, and some of it has already been fielded on the battlefield and for some time.
5th Gen Combat Air, through the F22 Raptor, has been in operational service since December 2005 – that’s 20 years ago and it first flew 28 years ago. The latest derivation, the F35 that is illustrated, entered operational service in August 2016 with the United States Marine Corp. That’s 9 years ago.
Russia’s equivalent the SU-57 entered service in 2020, and dates to 2010 for its inaugural flight. China, through the J-20, entered even earlier in March 2017.
Fifth Generation Combat Air isn’t new. It’s the peer-level baseline, and now the entry standard for any attempt to take even temporal Control of the Air in the most basic theatre of operations. For context, there are already circa 1500 5th Gen fighters globally, and the rate of production is accelerating, and accelerating fast.
Equally, the depicted Autonomous Collaborative Platform isn’t new.
(Slide) - Unclass Shahed 136 firing numbers
In its most basic form, Russia has been volleying the HESA Shahed 136 into Ukraine in frightening numbers and to varying levels of success. The trend line averages in the presented slide shows around 100 firings per day, but these are simple devices, that can be defeated. However, the volume, ease of production and unit costs are perhaps their most inherent military capability.
(Slide) - Boeing MQ-28; Anduril Increment 1 CCA; GA Increment 1
CCA
Additionally, our partners are taking this very seriously. Combat Collaborative Platforms (known as CCAs), which denote systems that are designed to undertake roles specific to Combat Air, are being developed rapidly.
Since 2019, under the auspices of the Airpower Teaming System, Boeing and the Royal Australian Air Force, have been developing the MQ-28 Ghost Bat. They are already in production of a Second Generation standard, and it has completed over 100 test flights and the intention is to conduct test launches of air-to-air missiles by early next year.
The United States Air Force CCA programme continues to see noteworthy progress. With a baseline requirement of 1000 CCAs for fulfil basic organisational structures, training range requirements, and sustainment concepts, the United States are investing levels of finance that are comparative to entire Combat Air programmes of European countries.
To be clear, CCAs are here, they are expanding at an exponential pace, and will be an integral part of any operational plan that desires Control of the Air.
(Slide) - Next Generation and the global scale of conflict – Flattening of the World
As a young Tornado GR4 Pilot it was an underlying assumption that ultra-low flying would allow a formation the ability to penetrate deep into enemy territory without being detected by their Integrated Air Missile Defence System. Radars cannot see through the ground and this underpinned our tactical thinking for many decades. However, AESA radar development and the all-pervasive abilities from Airborne Early Warning such as E7 and Space, including Over the Horizon Radars that bounce radar waves off the ionosphere, have rendered such tactics obsolete. Indeed, I have previously described this jump in technology to be tantamount to flattening of the earth and it allows detection ranges to span from 100s to 1000s of nautical miles. Simultaneously, the range of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles has developed at a similar rate and underpins our planning assumptions that the concept of Anti-Access/Area Denial (termed A2AD), currently covers distances measured in countries and, likely within the next decade, will be measured in continents. Looking forward, Deep Strike will become ever more challenging, but will become more critical to the success of an integrated campaign – unless you hold at risk what is most valuable to you adversary……their back garden…..you cannot and will never be able to deliver real deterrence.
What I have described is horizontal expansionism, and it is not the only area where the world will appear flatter. The most recent edition of Global Strategic Trends concluded that, by 2040, it would be a ‘good bet’ to assume the key characteristics of warfare will include vertical nuclear proliferation and that smaller or non-state factions will gain access to capabilities once reserved for solely the big states. It will create an ambiguous technological arms race, but it underpins our increased commitment to NATO, to further grow deterrence, such that the Government announced at the June NATO Summit that the RAF will procure F35A, and with it, rebuild an air-delivered nuclear strike capability via NATO’s ‘Dual Capable Aircraft’ (DCA) mission. We have not been a nuclear air force since the mid-90s, hence the bulk of our workforce will have little experience in this area. We should be in no doubt that this will be a heavy lift, and work must start now if we are to declare an assured capability at speed. It is vital that we build the right, cross-discipline foundation for this incredibly significant capability, which will redefine our RAF for decades to come.
(Slide) - IAMD
So where does this leave us for the ‘The Future of UK Air Power.’
Perhaps the most meaningful shift articulated in the SDR is our NATO First approach. Not only will this necessitate the raising of our ‘NATO IQ’, by becoming intimately conversant with SACEUR’s Theory of Winning, and our commitment to the NATO Family of Plans, but we must look for opportunities to lead and influence their development, and the capability planning that enables them. Within this is the need for UK to deliver on its Article 3 and, more significantly, Article 5 commitment, which starts with homeland defence and resilience, building defence in depth and enabling our ability to defend and fight from the home base. Under Defence Reform and key to Article 3, the RAF has been nominated as Lead Command for both Integrated Air and Missile Defence, and for Space, both of which must be significantly bolstered through this decade.
Delivering on the Strategic Defence Review’s commitment to Integrated Air and Missile Defence is a top priority for CAS, complementing the vital work already being undertaken by UK Space Command. The evolving threat landscape demands this focus. While the UK first experienced attacks from one-way drones and ballistic missiles in 1944, the capabilities of our adversaries have advanced dramatically. The pace of change continues to accelerate, with an increasing range of state and non-state actors posing new challenges. To meet these challenges, we must remain agile and adapt at pace.
Historical experience, including recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, highlights the scale of the challenge in defending against determined attackers. While offensive action to deny adversaries the capability to strike is the most effective option, NATO remains a defensive alliance focused on deterring aggression. Our task, therefore, is to underpin NATO’s deterrent posture by ensuring we can operate effectively and strike back decisively if attacked. Success will depend on integrating Air and Missile Defence capabilities across defence, government, and, most importantly, with NATO and key allies. This will enable a joint, multi-level, multi-domain, and multinational response.
As a first step, we will prioritise upgrading our existing Command and Control capabilities to maximise the effectiveness of current systems and lay the foundation for future enhancements. This new capability will be data-centric, cloud-based, and fully integrated across UK and NATO forces, aligning with NATO’s initiative for the rapid delivery of its enhanced Air Command and Control programme. It will leverage modern technologies, including artificial intelligence, to enable machine-assisted decision-making, allowing commanders to act decisively at the speed of relevance. Alongside these improvements, we will capitalise on advances in sensor technology to ensure decisions are based on the best possible information. This will include surface, airborne, and space-based sensors to extend detection and tracking ranges, increasing opportunities to engage and defeat threats through a system of layered defences.
In addition to enhancing detection, we will expand the range and capability of both active and passive defensive systems. These systems must address the broad spectrum of threats we face, from small drones and one-way attack systems currently in use across Europe to high-end ballistic and hypersonic weapons under development by adversaries. However, we must set realistic expectations. This is a significant challenge that will take time to address, and it is not feasible to defend all assets at all times. Instead, we will focus on defending the right assets at the right time, ensuring that any attack is met with a robust response.
The Strategic Defence Review underscores the importance of this task, as demonstrated by the government’s commitment of £1 billion during this parliament. While the challenge is immense, we are confident in our ability to succeed. By prioritising integration, leveraging modern technology, and maintaining a clear focus on deterrence, we will ensure the UK and its allies remain prepared to counter evolving threats and safeguard our collective security.
Beyond, it is critical that Air continues to master an ability to meaningfully execute its core mission of Control of the Air, and that leads to the obvious question: what of Global Combat Air Programme (known as GCAP) and the broader Future Combat Air System looking at evolving systems of integrated and interoperable capabilities. For many it then leads to their next question:
(Slide) - FCAS System of Systems
What is 6th Gen Combat Air?
From the slide, it is a system-of-systems that comes together to form capabilities that will underpin the Integrated Force and not simply provision just for the Combat Air Mission – This is an important statement and will make it very different to the concepts that define 5th Gen, and I will come back to this.
At the centre of it all is a crewed platform that will be the foundation for external systems to build upon. Yes, it is crewed, and this decision is underpinned by deep and very detailed operational analysis. Justin Bronk once described it to me as ‘not wanting to bet the farm on the unknown’, and, at this stage, it is far easier to automate a platform that has designed to crewed, rather than to retrospectively put a human in a platform that was created to be uncrewed. The fact that the United States through their recent decision to proceed with a crewed F-47 NGAD, Russia through their crewed MiG-41, or China through their crewed J-50 programme come to a similar conclusion and corroborates the accuracy our Operational Analysis.
Next, comes the need for it to be able to undertake deep strike missions and have the ability to detect, select, and prosecute targets that are operating in or on the far side of an opponent’s Integrated Air Missile Defence System. To do so, it needs to be not just stealthy for today’s war, but have the designed ‘signature; that will give us an advantage for the inevitable ‘cat-and-mouse’ contest for decades to come – I describe this as full spectrum stealth and this will be one of the most challenging parts of the platform’s design and an area that cannot be compromised in design. Simply put, without it, GCAP will be unable to enter an opponent’s A2AD bubble to a level that it would be able to deliver meaningful effect. Signature (stealth) really matters.
Earlier, I said I would come back to how 6th Generation system architectures will operate differently to that of 5th Generation. F35 and, to a lesser degree F22, have highly complex software engines that manage their systems, sensors, and how the platform thinks. I describe them as ‘selfish beasts’ that will consume vast quantities externally provided data, such they can produce a level of tactical awareness that is nothing short of exquisite. However, due to the platform’s highly secure and self-aware architectures, formations of 5th Generation aircraft share very little of the data they produce until after the sortie. They are tactically brilliant but have limited higher-level awareness to understand the operational battle.
This is where the design of 6th Generation needs to be different. In the future, the toil and resources required to enter an opponent’s A2AD bubble will necessitate the need for systems that are capable of feeding information to the widest operational-level cohort in real time. I describe this is being ‘operationally aware’ to the point 6th generation assets have the understanding that they may need to abort, compromise or even fail in their tactical mission, to support higher level operational outcomes. Such as concept is closer than you might think, with AI algorithms developed by DSTL and our own Rapid Capabilities Office, now capable of simultaneously managing thousands of aircraft converging globally into in a single operational theatre, and are currently 12 million times faster than a human at resolving complex planning issues – this is very real and we are only at the foothills of where this can take us.
In its most simple term:
5th Generation is about tactical superiority.
6th Generation is about bringing systems together that seek and understand the requirements and priorities for operational superiority.
(Slide) - The Changing role of GCAP – Picture of GCAP and CCA
Since World War 2, Combat Air Systems have become far more complex – moving from single role aircraft, to being able to undertake multiple roles, to becoming platforms that can cover almost every role of Air Power during the same sortie. In doing so, it has meant they have become more expensive and, generation-by-generation, take longer-and-longer to produce.
Therefore, we should assume that the 6th Generation platforms that we go to war with - and in reality you can include 4th and 5th generation - are going to be all we will access to for the length of the campaign. Therefore, they need to be hyper survival, and highly effective for the occasions when they are exposed to risk (to maximise effect for the exposure) and used in areas of the battlefield where they add greatest value. This leads us to three critical attributes required of our future platforms:
- It’s all about Range.
- The Stealth Signature cannot be compromised and needs to be designed for future Integrated Air missile Defence Systems
- It must carry meaningful payloads to the fight to maximise outcomes for the huge effort required to get it there.
The big ‘so what’ for 6th Gen is that it will need to be augmented with systems that enable the crewed platform to be more survivable, allow them to operate from areas of lower risk, and send forward platforms that are of lower cost, value, and can be scaled during a time of conflict; this is becoming the underpinning design assumption for CCAs.
Therefore, think of GCAP as a quarterback (or the scrum half if you ignore that fact that your cannot throw the ball forwards): operating far enough forward that it’s able to see, communicate and direct it’s CCAs, but not too far forward that it becomes perilous. Leave the really high-risk activity to the high numbers of low-cost systems that can ubiquitously operate deep into an adversary’s battlespace but can be replaced during the conflict if attritted. What I have described is the Hi-Low mix –or to continue with Rugby analogies, the scrum or the pack.
Such a concept is not solely a risk assessment that is undertaken by Defence. There needs to be an intrinsic understanding of our Wartime industrial capacity. Simply put, to recognize what can or cannot be produced during a time of conflict. Then to appropriately scale magazine depths according to the phase of transition to conflict.
(Slide) – Second World War industr
In peacetime: build what you cannot in war.
During war: build what you didn’t in peacetime.
The nuances of such simple statements are actually rather complex and are as much for the Defence Industrial base to resolve as they are for our new National Armaments Director Group. ‘In War’ production cannot be rapidly scaled without it being primed during periods of peace and will likely be formed from facets of the peacetime Defence Industrial Base that change the capabilities they produce. This thinking drives many of the origins of the Defence Reform process that is underway and underlies a clear mandate that the future of UK Air Power (and 6th Gen Combat Air) is as much about understanding Defence’s relationship with industry as it is about the air platforms it intends to buy. This is also why implementation of the Defence Industrial Strategy is so important. Indeed, if you look back to the Second World War, there is a compelling case to argue that for wars of national survival:
It is the nation’s military that stops it losing to stay in the fight; but it is the scaling of its industrial base that allows it to win. You need to address both.
(Slide) - blank
So, to come back specifically back to the RAF and our intent for the future:
CAS has made it very clear that Control of the Air is the thing that we must master above all else and is the core capability that we deliver for the Integrated Force.
GCAP / FCAS is the cornerstone of our future but, alongside our naval colleagues, we have adopted the same mantra of: ‘uncrewed where we can, crewed where we must’, and CCAs and ACPs will be foundational to our task.
(Slide) - ACP Analysis
The RAF has been operating uncrewed aircraft for well over 2 decades, where Reaper was one of the most operationally employed assets across Defence, and I am certain its replacement, Protector, will offer equal utility for our nation in the future.
But we are in era of these systems becoming more autonomous, more affordable, and employed in far greater numbers. Working alongside our international partners, our analysis shows that systems such as the recently announced Stormshroud, the UK’s first operational ACP that can conduct both Stand-off and Stand-in jamming, should be spirally developed with range being the critical attribute for enhancement to enable us to deliver rapid long-range strike over much greater distances.
For systems such as Lanner, which is being developed as a low-cost one-way effector that offers beyond-tactical ranges, reducing cost will be the biggest measure of success such that it can be scaled in meaningful numbers.
For absolute clarity: our future needs to be in the bottom right of the slide that is presented. Equally, through IAMD it will need to defend against systems that will emanate from the bottom right. The bottom right will define the future of Air Power and wider conflict. (Pause then next slide)
(Slide) - People
What I have described thus far has been very capability focused. But it is only one part of the puzzle. From inception, the RAF has been an innovative service at the forefront of technology with a proud tradition of innovation and adaptation. From its earliest days we brought together creativity, organisation, doctrine and decision-making to create a war-winning edge – this will not change in the future. CAS has stated we must continue to reinforce our foundations, by getting the basics right. Hence, ‘People’ must form the first pillar of our approach for the future, where recruitment, retention, culture, ways of working, and skills/training will be core focus areas. Our work in this area over the last two years has sought to address this, and in the broadest sense has been successful, we have gone from a shrinking Air Force, to one that is growing, albeit modestly. This must continue, and will need constant nurturing, and it will take time.
Cognitive diversity will be critical to our ability to stay ahead of our adversaries, so we need to appeal to the broadest cross-section of society. We are proud of what we have already achieved – the RAF was rated as a Top 75 Employer for Social Mobility in 2023 by the Social Mobility Foundation and circa 40% of our officers are drawn from previous careers in the ranks – but we can do more.
Ensuring we take the right risks will also help us unlock greater operational potential and agility. Much of the activity we deliver as a service requires close adherence to process and procedure; this focus on risk over the past 15 years has made us safer and more efficient. But, while RAF personnel are taught the importance of understanding and managing risk, 3 decades of wars of choice operated in assured air supremacy, has led to low-risk tolerances in some areas. Recent operations and the war in Ukraine are resetting this paradigm, demonstrating very clearly that our innate understanding of risk is allowing us to push risk envelopes to the maximum to achieve operational imperatives. We have demonstrated this on a range of operations, whether conducting airlift from Kabul, dropping aid in Gaza, flying ISR missions in the Black Sea and our rapid adaptation of capability in support of Ukraine. This is an evolution from a “risk averse” to “risk sensible” culture originally described by Haddon-Cave. Indeed, our actions now pave the way for other Air Forces to follow. Replicating this operational approach to risk at home, across the Whole Force, and in the way we train is the logical next step. But for the future, we need to live every minute thinking how we will behave operating wartime levels of risk. This is why the RAF must remain at the fore of those developing synthetic systems, specifically Gladiator, that allows us to grow and rehearse in a way that we simply cannot in the live environment.
Take this to its logical conclusion and it is possible that the next war we fight will be won or lost in a simulator and then simply validated on the battlefield.
(Slide) - Agile, Integrated, Ready
Conclusion:
As I draw this lecture to a close, it is appropriate to look at the historical relevance of Air Power in the context of future warfare. We have discussed and seen the implications if you fail to make it a foundational requirement that creates the freedoms for manoeuvre for the integrated force. Conversely, we have also seen how effective and potent it can be when properly factored at the beginning of a campaign. The lessons of World War two remain as relevant today as they were 80 years ago.
For deterrence to truly work, your adversary needs to fear being hurt. The ability to threaten what they value most through events such as long-range strike will make them think twice about threatening our sovereign shores. It was once waves of Avro Lancasters and USAF B-17 Fortresses flying into Europe, in the future it may be GCAP with waves of CCAs, but technology is different, but the concept is not.
In an uncertain future, Air Power will continue to be Defence’s first responder, the Nation’s first line of defence, and the Integrated Force’s quickest means of strike, with the flexibility, speed and reach to deliver effect globally. But, we will need to evolve. We will need to deliver more. And the entire Defence Enterprise will be needed to ensure we can be more Agile, Integrated, and Ready to fly fight and win, today, tomorrow, and together.
End
Overview
Air Vice-Marshal Beck discusses the role of interoperability and integration in deterring our adversaries. He also explores how our air and space forces can work together seamlessly to counter future threats, and how emerging technologies can be utilised to ensure our capabilities remain at the cutting edge.
The lecture is moderated by Matthew Savill, Director of Military Sciences, RUSI.
Speakers Biography
