The shadow fleets of Russia, Iran and North Korea are in the international spotlight, but efforts to counter their operations will fail while these vessels can so easily obtain new flags.
This report on Hungnam Fertiliser Complex is the fourth Project Anthracite site profile exploring different chemical production facilities throughout North Korea. The paper provides an assessment of both the chemicals produced on site for their relevance to a potential chemical weapons programme, and whether and how the site would be declarable under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
This report outlines the chemical steps required to produce key precursor chemicals required to support chemical weapons. It considers the upstream and downstream processing steps from raw materials, such as coal, that could potentially give North Korea access to those precursor chemicals.
The global effort to disrupt proliferation financing is becalmed. A new body responsible for monitoring North Korea’s nuclear ambition reveals why this needs to change.
North Korea has supplied up to 5.8 million artillery rounds to Russia according to the Open Source Centre. This is potentially 40% of Russia’s ammunition, showing the extent to which North Korea’s illicit activity has extended the war.
The international community continues to face challenges in recovering criminal proceeds. This guide is designed to support jurisdictions in the early stages of developing crypto-asset recovery frameworks, offering guidance on crafting mitigating strategies and adopting practices that could enhance the effectiveness of confiscation efforts.
Why did North Korea decide to deploy its troops to Ukraine? Pyongyang appears to be concerned that Trump’s electoral victory could restrict its opportunity to become a critical part of Russia’s Eurasian security architecture and to cement its status as a nuclear power.
This guide provides an update to RUSI's 2019 'Guide to Conducting a National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment'. Its goal is to assist jurisdictions conducting national proliferation financing risk assessments with guidance and best practices, while also addressing a range of proliferation financing threats.
In June 2024, RUSI’s Centre for Finance and Security set up the UK Sanctions Implementation and Strategy Taskforce. This report presents findings from the second meeting of the Taskforce, held in October 2024.
North Korea’s entry into the Russia–Ukraine war has globalised the conflict, intensifying the risks as Ukraine faces two highly militarised adversaries.
With the deployment of North Korean troops in Ukraine complicating the global geopolitical landscape, how does South Korea perceive the current situation, what challenges may constrain its response, and how will it ultimately react?
This paper offers a nuanced exploration of North Korea’s approach to deterrence by examining the trade-offs in arsenal structure amid fissile-material constraints.
In this episode, host Tom Keatinge, CFS Director, is joined by Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS, to discuss her co-authored article ‘Axis of Upheaval’.
This paper outlines proliferation finance activity tied to the casino and gaming sector, as well as the emergence of new avenues of exploitation that authorities should analyse as part of their national risk assessment process.
This paper analyses North Korea’s procurement networks, particularly in view of North Korea’s programmatic successes and recent geopolitical shifts in Russia’s relationship with North Korea as a result of the war in Ukraine.
