In this episode, host Tom Keatinge, CFS Director, is joined by Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at CNAS, to discuss her co-authored article ‘Axis of Upheaval’.
This paper outlines proliferation finance activity tied to the casino and gaming sector, as well as the emergence of new avenues of exploitation that authorities should analyse as part of their national risk assessment process.
This paper analyses North Korea’s procurement networks, particularly in view of North Korea’s programmatic successes and recent geopolitical shifts in Russia’s relationship with North Korea as a result of the war in Ukraine.
While the recently signed agreement between Russia and North Korea has sparked concern in the West, the reality is that cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang on sensitive technologies is not new – it is merely coming out into the open.
This report focuses on international and unilateral sanctions frameworks regarding the proliferation of WMDs in North Korea, Iran and Russia, identifying the challenges of implementing counter-proliferation finance and sanctions controls.
North Korean tankers have begun loading oil from a Russian port in the country’s Far East an analysis of dozens of satellite images shows, partially lifting the veil on what Pyongyang has secured in return for the transfer of vast quantities of munitions and missiles.
This paper aims to examine cryptocurrency mixers’ distinct technical, legal and regulatory dimensions and the challenges they pose to the sanctions regime. The paper provides detailed background information on North Korea’s cyber-criminal statecraft, focusing on North Korean actors’ use of mixers to launder illicitly obtained cryptocurrency.
This workshop report summarises the discussion of 10 scholars, debating what impact AI has on geopolitics, whether there is a need for a new analytical framework to capture AI’s impact on international relations, and what we can learn from other technologies and their respective impact on geopolitical developments.
The ballistic missiles that Russia fires into Ukraine not only bring death and destruction, but also fundamentally delegitimise international sanctions.
In return for providing ammunition to bolster Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, Pyongyang has sought something in return: assistance with developing its own space programme.
This paper examines North Korean onward proliferation of missile and nuclear technology, based on a review of Pyongyang’s recent technological advancements and developments in North Korea’s customer base. The authors assess the likelihood of North Korea selling its missile and nuclear technology onwards, and the kinds of technology that may be for sale and to whom.
Countries such as Iran, North Korea and Russia are under sanctions. How do these ‘rogue’ states cooperate to evade them? And what can the sanctions coalition do to counter their circumvention efforts?
Pyongyang’s alleged decision to close around a quarter of its overseas missions reflects both the evolving sanctions-busting landscape and more concerning rapidly shifting geopolitical realities.
Dozens of high-resolution images taken in recent months reveal that Russia has likely begun shipping North Korean munitions at scale, opening a new supply route that could have profound consequences for the war in Ukraine and international security dynamics in East Asia.
The 20th anniversary of the interdiction of nuclear technology that helped to bring down the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network provides an opportunity to consider the enduring threat posed by nuclear proliferation networks.
RUSI’s Open Source and Intelligence Analysis (OSIA) report, Inside North Korea's oil smuggling: triads, ghost ships and underground banks, which shone a spotlight on North Korea’s oil smuggling practices, won the ‘Digital Storytelling’ award in collaboration with the Financial Times.
